

9-21-15

As it was agreeing over ... Turkey
(JFK prepared...)

(#VFK was pushing to
make public deal the
next day)

(Suzanne - 1 day)

having drawn back the
warning from it, adds
potentially existing crisis

(China - not drawing (drain of cash was
dropped, and think had a war in it))

5 PM - B-59

(Lester, 8-130!)

What led to this moment

(Mantle - no sign of K leaving
but US aircraft (the real days - -
not days

blockade:

blockade:

blocks

K warlike

frontiers

People's
Power

what got in
workbooks...

Oct. 2002 - lesson for Iraq? (log down
SW to
Tel Aviv)

What have we learned?

on the record (class.) nothing...
Ritter

Went ^{brought} ~~brought~~ over to 5 PM # 10-27

(fire - Tenant rules, DDC's

pts. Autumn Bay Knille?

met to Burn - Chris unco

(more on Burns, River 2002?)

Were exercises provocative? (Oxford?) (JFK fan of Roy) /
C-I moving it NSA? / back...
book...

RFK - what if miners?

* ~~the~~ JFK protests 9-3, 9-16 — in living (K! & NIE!)

McN: Eng this!

no MRBMs

Southern — If we thought ...

beginning JKF, MCIS
Keating has it first!

||(What JFK found)

A Bad Day

|| opposite PSALM:
VCS base home - gain PSALM
insurance

JFK has several endings!

(that point more leads -

"marty mission, attacks"

"if B-52 had covered me..."

(YES!!!)

[~~the~~ ask: Who did JFK give up intent in mining?

late July, early August — SC committed (Berlin)

(Wantel JFK here profound Army/Berlin crisis

begin abetted? or to postpone it (if it was
certain)

Q: Blockade gives up attack — despite many bluffs

Seaway: NIE didn't know Kyoto!
Post-Month
(or in November?)!

OR mission planning,
Oct 1-2

SU: two runs

Torpedoes

if subs had been "attacked" Oct 24?

Fri night Moscow: K arrives to boggs
Sat night JFK agrees to boggs

(monthly)

AA

U-2 (impossible to find if AA; like Sanity)
sub B-59

Fri night? (Hanneton): two runs (out of or mission
Okinawa: forces)

Themes

9-22-15

It was dangerous

> 10%

and

Others were more
right than he was

(+ was wrong)

Not for reasons public thought

+ was right but they were wrong
about that.

(Did JFK commit starting like (K winter
to present)

JFK had to fool/bluff Congress and SCS/wine.
as well as K

(He was too coming to Castro

what he signed!)

AA! and

(In the end, he didn't fool SCS: or Cuba or VN

He was sight of K, world, or CTB

NATO, US -

but it for SCS (+ no C-I, Laos,
(did that with?) OmniWall,
VN, PTB, Am Univ.

(Cost:

(like Cuban)

He deserves credit for not

doing what tanks wanted: Oct 16-27

~~but~~ SCS deserve credit for Win -

at risk of the world
that, big long

(agent to better
intents)

(and for always be subtract)
bottoming coup

9-22-15

"We" thought it was a warmer crisis —
it was!

It was a Berlin-Cuba crisis, as K thought.

It was not purely "Cuban Crisis" as K said,
they partly

K said not intent to press on Berlin,
(after viewing collapse in Cuba) as he
said — he won't bluffs, or mislead, or
misdirecting.

(* as still cover — about GDR
(more than Berlin) + NATO

— + questioned Oct 22 — "If one (?) is fired..."
(+ didn't believe with scale of this)

I questioned: If 10% chance — ASW?
(attacked?)

(My values were right)

I was not worried went 50 MRBMs

Russia w

or blockade

(except values? Not)

(Proceeded - like TG, Aug 2 1964)

Whole stream of decisions brought eventual
ONLY
TIME to that point - where one man did
have to decide, a plausible target,
authoritative (more than 1 or 2 equal) modulus/using
to fire (2 vs. 1)

(like force alone - Yelton 1993?

Patterson - 1983 (Penkovich)

1962 Force alone)

(N 1969 ?!

PBSF: no notion of blunder

or fallacy of ... (Slaughter Case!) - CW

"destroy us"

(as Berlin

⇒ fallacies on JCS

⇒ JFR vs. JCS / tanks

9-22-15

This is not a story of the long '60's
or of the Cold War -

It is a story of the modern era
which we are still in -

the ES/FD era (now for both
CF, Dep., etc. U.S., R, S, Is, Pak,

External areas of "comitiat" China

distinct

invariably local balance of pro-war forces

("neo-colonial")

"and for FD think"

we oppose

we emit very valuable.

metastatic Cuba

not, "to the other chick"

so we don't want to be not
any to prevent Cuba! (or Berlin!)

- Latin American, Cuba!

(mainly who?)

so not (mainly) another ~~cross~~ cross
Ketos

"to prevent a no war" (OK)

"by S.U from being ~~the~~ our way"

JFK bluff / comes 50 miles

as Castro was signing

(~~to~~ don't know with to JFK will

make countries

"ANY NECESSARY!"

- but no more than necessary

(at east of Castro's country)

going - both (all) what

last public

9-28-15

TR

int R knew next VPK didn't

- He didn't feel STAY at O-2

(begin - out of control)

- Control AT (pretty little)

- [one tapless]

[one two press]

Near-miss

Alan F. Phillips

Kits of Safety Bag

1961 moon B MENS

fail at

Nov 24 '61 (Semi-Bridge)

Oct 24-27 O-2 int SU 102A with no

Oct 24 62

Oct 25

Oct 26 6201 later lower (but

9-25-15

By this is not evil, what is?

Tanks in Berlin..

(What if this came after Balakian
and he dissociated?)

("If you go first, I will...")

(JFK can't back down in front of Cheney!)

(Even having K forced parade from
banks was proportionate

misunderstanding

when there was

asymmetry!

("BPM" or bad you acting!)

But JFK went to attack: on Monday, Tues...

with Thurday (McCain committed him?!)

("not McRaman")

— Wernin, Kyong

or was he bluffing from beginning,

or from Tuesday? Mohr



JFK had not only to (be seen to) take risks, he
had to threaten minimum 1) to resign & CS, until...

- 2) to scream public + allies, so they would
accept & only — only, not Bush accepts a treaty
- 3) to be wild

Carter (or k) was not "parasitic"
or improperly USE lentil
for slow pool or other reasons

9-25-16

"We" fear loss of dominion economically in
Europe (new, East Eu)
Japan
Central & South America
Mexico

to trade with Russia
& China

or rise of new
force

R fears: loss of dominion of non-aboveaf
& R!

(K might depend for inflow in L.A. & TW

travel

from alluvium of new

NK

(then, if it could)

Pak

V.S. "Better dead than Red"

JFK ~~wanted to interview~~ to console if mess
comes too late to prevent world being muddled
that afternoon

5 o'clock

(Bulldog) critics

asymmetries

It was a bull-fight / CORRIDA

(no bull died. ONES)

8W on horns ...

9-24-15

JFK: "on the" — "will make" Grea
"will see in VN
+ will

Dangers
by
in C-I: (after saying, faithfully, + will not see
JCS
to orient before
to prevent in AGO
(then to killed) "control" in
(b/c, CS in VN!)
to avoid base leased
(Disposal problem)

Petroleum w. H.O. in Africa
(now, Syria? Iraq? (Arabia; after
= VN '67)

9-22-15

JFK wouldn't have quit of Sunday
morning

or afternoon?

K might have quit of Sunday
evening (OC) - 28 hrs

JFK had given him until Monday night
(RCK to me)

so JFK could hold off quitting
until (Monday afternoon)

K couldn't

Without C, JFK wins, too - K can't
wait 45-48 hours, JFK can.

(thanks to C (+ two more) K quits Sunday noon),

no "tightening
deadline"

If mrs doesn't blame us...

Ronan: clock!

(B-36 on surface - didn't experience

Solomon:

"alarm" (or call it? Major!)

K Error: orders to ^{be ready to} attack Paul Huber

self defense

+ Hartman

missiles

+ maximum flight!

(Not, Turkey;)

w. mines

en in GW!

no ICBMs

or Paul!

will no need to
proposition for that!

NATO: bluff or not? after ~ 1958? 1960?

9-22-15

Typh II	bluff { "Sug '52 "Aug '61 "Cuba '61	Egypt 1973?
Typh II external	SU "umbrella" over Cuba	
Typh II b	external (and real case?)	(1962: N/VN?)
C-II		
Skorozj	Typh II 2 are anti:	like US & UK <u>theirs</u>
Skorozj	other non-nuc	US over Europe (& Japan)
Skorozj	attack / stalemate	over Berlin (Greece)

Now, over northern Ukraine!

"umbrella" — minimum (definitely nuclear),
massing)

like Star Wars "shield" "dome" Dome
(VCS — our shield!)

rather, instead of real strategic
deterrance

(non-fences: checks
clocks)

"arses are for throwing" — BLUFFING
yet — not entirely

C-II — each behind other's bluff

enough to be deterred from attacking — but
not from dogging, throwing (bluffing + they said not right)

use of close-close
case

X (extrapolations
IGNORED!) C-II by ~ Sept. 30? out 10? (unreliable,
incredible,
BUT about but
to Norway: cut down C-II 80-90% if end of year
+ FU cars

A) US-R

Danger: 2 NWs:

B) Asia-Pac

C → as many deaths

as Germany or US vs. axis in WWII

1-2M?

~ .9 + .6 + .3 = 1.8 M (m .9 + .3 + ? = US debate
with us (two))

Brienzschiff is Moskow's Schiff

"I will" (real) \rightarrow I may

(less real;

but still real,

irreversible,

irrecoverable

irreversible

+ lasting itself, now

(in comparison of 2016

= 2004/08 (then)

Now - MAOs & both?!

this time, vs. NWS

(as if $A = B = C$)

Even without smoke / winter,

$\Rightarrow A = C$

Film was wrong in 1982

" = "Hinomai (A-
even)

or about 1981 - as estimated by

which would

VCS: not $\frac{1}{4}$ of world pop.,

= burning 10, less)

or $\frac{1}{3}$ ($1B$): more like $\left(\frac{1}{2}\right)$ (inc. SU nres),

(no more!)

In 1982, pop. was?

Gunning/Worson \rightarrow County / Blit / Hauig, Rondon, Edo, (64+)
Rutherford, $\rightarrow N + N \rightarrow 100$ SC acts (A)

$\rightarrow H \rightarrow$ ^{S1OP-62} _{DNA} ^{burnt Park -} _{more winter}

Our scale: burnt-Park (100A)

= VCS est of S1OP-62 ($\frac{1}{3}$ pop)

and real S1OP-62 is a DM (98-99%)

Reback — Sawre isn't driven on MT; ^{young}

In 1961, big MT, big yearl —

was (?) under the same or ^{walnuts}
much smaller MT is smaller, more numerous
yearlings & small walnuts on
large units — more
than 1 ^{large} yearl.

Calico now took a few MT of small yearls
to get MT of adult

9-22-10

W_Y "call" me to answer
(y what?)

appropriate guarantee
Order - record of 5-59

My hope: to place
DUSA^{try to}
JCS (like bussiness)

Melvin Conradi of string (Renygister)
Hag Slaughter Cam Off, Cony

long: NO

Want K have the willing to concill
(without Turkey) — as I expected — on
Oct 28 or Oct 29

without fear of Castro starting
war on 28th? as I expected?

Yes — he was, very right —
if RPK had held fort — as I wanted?

+ Econ

(What did Econ expect, but?!

in opposing Turkey deal?!

What would small group have said
about Pust-Castro deal (which became
mit more about? But right —
as being, if RPK after repelled?

Others, what? attack?!

Both bluffs:

Bob K didn't have had to be bluff because
JFK didn't count on that: [C was with com]

Stewarl?

Craig Buckle ASW officer on?

8-21-15

Che was nice — JFK didn't "have" to

but that was not because JFK simply said, "No" and threatened attack as it fairly appeared. Rather

but because K knew:

JFK was about to lose control of his ability to bolster off attack, wanting for K to agree (or, to give in himself)

JFK couldn't stop mean and contemptuous attacks on men by threatening K, apparently because (he didn't know)

K couldn't stop attacks

Gentlemen were quite clever

(Kann to me)

JFK couldn't organize

JFK "had" to avoid public portraits by DCS

(leads, traverses, visitations)

that she was chicken, cruel, treacherous

or what they prepared (her CJS '65) [didn't happen] in 1961, 1962, 1963

by doing (going there) at least 1) blockade

2) mean (and?) (works?)

(SAC) + OSAF

9-21-15

One theory starts:

- Nat. in control (with the win)

- Exs: To protect troops, "win"

- Pre-plans

- Coms "lose," must "win"

(or if stalemate, "try to win")

Coms let troops "die in vain"

"unnecessary"

Never, private

"evil" (bad to evil)

(of country)

C-II Broader threat: fail to shipper

tells all white ton, & SADs, AA

- invasion

shoaling "lunar, RT" - coincid

1920, CFR

no exports!

no imports! (as in WWI briefly!)

torture / terror

didn't work for leaders,

either! as in Japan!

8-15-15

from 10-23

1

Crisis ended as I expected - K withdraws
but I wouldn't have worried about it - "no chance" of war - Cuba or Turkey
at attacking

Cuba (I expected?)
not only because K was outgunned
me to Dillon in Cuba [as won't?] and seemingly
[40K troops, with tanks (he was) (they)
tanks could have matched 2nd Inf'ty?
4 are torpedoes! (?)

Not because JFK first had fair, thoughtful
(K didn't have to give 3rd an option decline.)

nor because ^{did he get} because of U.S.
K could have won - with mores at war,
SACs, too many, troops

and more ^{debate + silence} mently
(His plan: too much ^{debate + silence} preening, too long! CA

(and deployment of missiles,
too soon!) [too little control

He could have won
as late as Friday or (mon),
Sat.)

(Would JFK have delayed acceptance
of his offer but many of his
know - K had told (Friday night!)
moving from 2:15 to
[and knowledge of
missiles, assass)

unknown to JFK?

? Wernit CIA-Mafia-Cubans
worrying torpedo or assassin, Castro AND JFK or Nov. 22 JFK assassin.

SACs

CIA-Mafia: C-I 1960-6B

2.

JFK (as if you hot. night) wants
panis to feel fear

He was to go ~~Stalin's~~ ^{Stalin's} route
~~Sandy or Mosley~~

AFTER JFK

^{JFK}
He didn't expect smooth short-clap
or know what he would do (avoid night flights)
Sandy

- U-2

(wasn't Sandy morning?)

PANIC
K didn't "panic" and begin, for
fear of ~~saint~~ ^{deliberate} US attack early morning
(long warning about broadcast by
milk, ^{Moscow} Moscow early morning DC)

Private
Result: deal is what has been
K prepared - about waiters
worthless.

Issue: Why did K quit - accept
JFK proposal ("=" his married offer
of Friday night, expecting immediate
(wrongly) - what he was willing to settle
for when he expected immediate marriage
(as of ^{Wed?} Thursday - "so what we can get,
≥ no-marriage principle")

- who + as he did - who he was no longer
married (Sunday morning, Moscow - about wine, didn't mention -

cont. — and RFK had given him another 12-36 hours, to decide
or bargin? Why did he act as if invasion was soon imminent
(<12 hours), like Friday night? What had been: — SAG, Carter, AS 44 (3)
Crisis ended — why not as it did —
because events were getting / had gotten
out of control of either K or JFK
and were fast approaching an inevitable
explosion;
and JFK was ignorant of the
dangerous air forces were using
(R hadn't told him) (he couldn't imagine
now his actions)
but K knew, knew that JFK didn't
know — his knowledge of recent risks
meant he (now he) had to be the one
to back off, back down — except an
offer on the table from his opponent;
at first let things go to a point
where there was no time left
(before a possible explosion)
to inform his opponent
or to make a counter-offer.

K didn't know:

JFK wanted to
accept lot. moving

BIG SECRET

— JFK was on the verge of
accepting his last offer (perhaps next day)
~~JFK~~ (- sub deal: that would have
confirmed his decision)

pt 4

JFK didn't know:

- Castro out of K's control - hence, JFK's
(see H-1)

- K didn't know:
- ~~Tac~~ ~~Mos~~ (no PALS; ~~prior obligation~~; out of K's control)
 - 40 K SU troops
 - SAM out of K's control,
- US never out of JFK's control (hence,
- US destroyers out of JFK's control.
(Varying from
U-2 over SU

K did not "lose" grit even he did

(despite last morning DC ~~extera~~ ~~are~~ U-2/STM

K optimum -唐 ~~track~~

U-2 Poly

AA

(sub-ctrl)

(≈ missile stage in Cuba)

so, there

toe lines do stay, + no-mission failure

gains his his

(helps K on Berlin, like IRBMs;

now advantage

- within US-SU equality

in Berlin, = missiles

- derails NATO, upturns US

Does he give up

cred or leadership

Cuba? No:

(Will US sacrifice cities for Berlin?)

He can say,

we have our

own control of

to get Cuban missiles withdraw?

local commands

and can't threaten SU missiles out

without a threat?

(40k): more convincing

than NATO/US protection of

Berlin (more vulnerable than Cuba) (protected by US ICBMs; as K claimed
by Carter, 1981!)

(5)

// So, bluff - intransigence - making threatening displays
and threats (animals, birds, gorillas) on the edge of
a territory (another ~~was~~ ~~was~~ ~~was~~ ~~was~~ ~~was~~ ~~was~~ ~~was~~ ~~was~~ ~~was~~ neutral)

What if Castro had shot down 2 planes (it hit)
an satellite? or satellite? or US intervention?

Could JFK only have

1)

and brought back -> the reward - close to
an expression

(and our - K - knew it, but the JFK.

JFK found ultimate means by K

SATR

AA

which he hoped to detonate by threats
(but won't there be much reward)

actually, K (know he) was not in
control: Castro (*as per his!) was
not under his control, nor his SATR!
(resists?)

(nor JFK's intervention!)

Okinawa!

MW

RF:

"+ our
shields
toward
ourselves":
"+ with
steps"
HIPPOS

Our driver playing Chicken (K) knows
he is losing battle fluid part (or his strong
wheel is coming loose) — he is about to lose
control — and knows the other driver doesn't
(as., opening threats at strong wheel; been broken, but not
SWERVE.

6

Chairwoman Lyne: for task

task stopped; like RF for me, & Shirley

Int.: Second, ball-dancer

Brije Willson

Loss of control:

At a certain point (when slots are fixed, exchanged)

Zurts get out of centralized, top, control: leaders (if they remain) (or not)
can't stop, break, manipulate, change place

- Coxon broke down (first few rows!)
- lower-levels wait with chairs, without wanting to inform higher committees or for the reply: supervisor
 - o rarely follow other plans
- pressure on lower committees: "about to die" (Santah)
or "target about to disappear,"
others are being
SACI committee
 - going to lose rows
- pressure on Pres - from wife,
from Congress
 - (possible impeachment, or coup)
 - "no choice"

But neither
is over bras

(Okinawa)

Kiev - shots in Maidan Square
trout to Pres - he flees

(7)

Armenia flees

Moscow - prison (this)

Batista flees

Thatcher flees

(Din does not -
tell too late)

Lumumba does not -
tell too late

Castro does not

GVN does not, in 1964-65

Gorbachev - Conf

No does not
-

JFK - dead (MLK, Malcolm X, RFK

(like Tariq ibn Ziad with JFK
not Castro)

(

2

* thought:

- all JFK had to do was say,
"Get the crit" (you have no business,
no need, no right (genine #2) to
blow them up)
- or we'll blow them up" (we to Dillan)
and stay with that: "we are balance"
and K had to do it -adjective
and he did it.

* was right.

Risk was $\frac{1}{100}$ ($\frac{1}{1000}$)^{ASR}

But Nife was right: (why?)
on prob. did he believe it?
We knew balance. (?)

K might not get out and fight anyway
* "calling our bluff" (JFK was bluffing),
though ISS not)

and 1) JFK might not be bluffing, attack
MRBMs go off

(Nife didn't know of two pros,
miss, SAD, AA out of control, the family
"or SAC does something" (not O prob.)
anyway, both present in threats
while forces operate in Cuba.

* + ASR + JCS
even if it's what they
or K meets in Berlin, Treaty
(only low prob - but not in JFK yes!)

not 10% of or higher:

crisis permits, to a point
where forces are operating in
 an environment of conflict
 war a sport (that initiates
 invisible loc.) is likely, more likely
 than 10% in S-R

see WWI

(not focus in China
 or (Paul Henley)
 or Hitler)

10% clear crisis will lead to a
Saturday, when

like Berlin → Oct. — 1961

(Wg was & still pushing us in
 Berlin — after my speech
NATO WALL

NIE — Helmsley

deadline dropped?

lighter — tanks

WWK — "most dangerous" went
 (not known, badly)

10,

Can feather in Ukraine / Kiev = Cura?
elsewhere = Berlin?

in R "empire": (Divided Ukraine: VN
Chin
Korea
Germany
Berlin
(West)
Kemarita
Pashtunistan

East Ukraine = Cura for R/Putin
Berlin

"Aren't going to lose it;
"It's threatened; All threat EU"

or local-area [Recent recognition: threat of "part
Cura; Kiev
countries"
Oppose Soviets or "national areas"
Chin, Germany,
US)

South VN

(South Korea)

(Kwangtung 1958)

11.

"Nuclear Option"

Extremely disproportionate threat

(to carry out: illegal, immoral
act, to threaten? risk?

minimizing material (& mental)
deterrence

supposedly threat
involves "no risk"

(bluff; "I won't do it,
& can't will control it;
 $\frac{1}{100}$, $\frac{1}{1000}$, expensive
but a.i. 6/1m)

- Hitler used of Cong. filibuster

- Defaulting on ^{US} gov debt
Sanction you down

"Modern Strategy" - Brexit - default on bank debt
- ~~leaving~~ leaving Euro (or, EC)

/ the war GW

Climate (cost, threats; simply, rapidly forcing
to coop. on metanets (cont'd: opportunity
of benefits;
of debts;
GDP
Costs of transition

DS:
we don't always know/
feel perfect (as if we knew)
"which is more likely:
and that is \neq ="

Ans now...

Prob

(probab.)

formally not definite (relative) prob. (not first, not precise; not $>$, $<$, $=$)

{ Not sure it will be carried out

{ Not sure it won't

"Not definite relative"

"vague" answer, Ambiguous

WKOOM

9-30-15

All animals have a capacity for (being in)
Desire.

All know, all the time, an is desire and
harm things.

(Fortunately, not everyone is in desire
and wants all the time).

(Vs. desire - you can foul nose enough of
the public example of the time*)

* = many adjs.

Eliot (eg?) "Human kind cannot bear ~~stand~~ ^{bear} very
much reality." 4 Quotations

Hoffe: "I say over late the truth."

"and was willing known truth," (?)

Never, ~~many~~ thoughts of crazy behaviors
are smoke - less, not bluff.

- not care credible

- not care live up fronted

- or not behaved, not bluff,
blow up circ.!

and that was great —

it was dangerous — not (very dangerous)
because after JETK or K we had
nothing else to say before or after

(Well, K was;
not more than N?)

or the (JFK) GWB?...)

but because the threat
invariably left something to choose (>0)

TCS

Partnership

(Rise to US from US FS would be then
almost your expression. in US:

but not to Europe, Germany!

(or only, to would. still:

that

0) Effect of US FS.

1) Warnings Rise of US attack on China — invasion —

was initially greater than anyone in US knew
for 30 years!

2) of VFR (in JETK) promise / decide to
attack (in invasion) for first time of
(not-changed for promise & invader) signed!

(Formerly, CB was less manipulable by US less
arbitrary, then assessing of VFR before!)

On War Plans + Alliances

9-1-15

Meeting: K rejects notion of
"Kreislauftheorie"

Yet it is a constant threat
in his decision-making

C Berlin

Welles "tet"

Saw plans UN for Europe:

C-II

(Stalin: Korea)

and JFK's: (C-I) C-II

Blockade)

(+ H, (C-III - Plans?))

Note partly minor in!

He could / should have succeeded
more easily if:

even given ^{then} them except for Comto

(After all wrong)

8-30-15

The stage of the war is intangible^{10 PM}
and measurable (unreal, unpredictable
not-intangible, predictable)
not because of (many, or limited to)

- Profil expand US-D ~~St~~ or expand Pow-5
("Exp. Saudi, Pet, Israel")
- Profil expand POW-D 9 NK
(from...)
- Profil to "Angola, Aspen Stats"
(thoroughly belittle groups, etc.
very dangerous)
or to less present, more recess
leaves than US president or in SU usually were

This emphasizes some of both, less
present (certain to impress K well -

"How would he have
the pet be controlled"

Hollie's

to reveal that risks were reduced...
just despite this being more controversy
than they afforded (or intended to be)
and so controversy is undeniable
One can expand, even cont policies;

Risks are so great now — (longer battle profif)

(4) called his bluff (green, Röhlrich)

Merkel

and this one to her Green

⇒ less雄心, more Berlin (GDR)

and f

Could have worked; given ability to conclude
because it would have worked!

Point: World didn't blow up

NOT because with K as SEC

was extremely reckless

or as sellers/bell/aggression

to the approval + potential crisis;

(bluff)

It was not more reckless than

any other

(U, say, India - Pak)

(don't say: OK (?))

(increased to far!)

or OBL/AQ-1

(ISIS: We are not good "fighters")

(us-controlled aggression, yes

or, something st!)

esp. now in ME

In late 1958 (after Bonn Mo.) to several upstays

ARMED to QDR — to three Kuwait + Persia:

(after Aug '58).

(NOT good enough — w. "hostages"

and not break US monopoly of power
to dictate control of exports — 1st or 2nd

C-II

Dear K

withdrawn

end of - year deadline
on Power Treaty / GDR

: (annual for does?)
recognition!

(could withdraw?

Acknowledgment? F?

Acknowledgment?)

before 1st October?

or, fine not withdraw
it?

"no gap" [^{not:} (ox) us]

4 (cont)